The Battle of Kolb's Farm
by
Wayne C. Bengston
(Editors
note: This article is posted here with permission of its author).
Near
Kennesaw Mountain
June
22, 1864
Estimated
casualties: 1350 (Union: 350, Confederates 1,000)
From
the Beginning of the Atlanta campaign, Lieutenant General Joseph E.
Johnston faced in reality, two adversaries. The first adversary
was Union General William Tecumseh Sherman who had over twice the
amount of troops that Johnston had under his command. The second
adversary was one of his own corps commanders, John Bell Hood.
(Hood's portrait is seen here on the right).
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Johnston,
knowing Sherman's strength and his tactics, preferred to delay Sherman
rather than to confront him with a headlong assault that surely would
result with heavy casualties. Hood, up to the time of his transfer to
the West, was influenced by the teachings of Robert E. Lee and
Stonewall Jackson. He did not believe in delay tactics. He did not
believe in entrenchments. His school of thought was, you can win if you
attack continuously, no matter what the cost may be. During The Atlanta
Campaign, he continuously wrote Braxton Bragg and Jefferson Davis
without Johnston knowing, complaining about Johnston's tactics. Yet
several times during the campaign, Hood procrastinated in obeying
Johnston's orders to attack. In fact, his behavior at times was close
to being insubordinate. Johnston on the other hand, believed in
entrenching, delaying, and only attacking when the advantage was
definitely his. He believed that real estate could be lost and retaken
later, but that when a soldier dies, he cannot be brought back to life
to fight again. Lee's campaign in Virginia started around the same time
that the Atlanta Campaign started. Lee in a three month campaign, lost
no less than forty thousand men, while during the same period of time,
Johnston lost about ten thousand killed and wounded, while inflicting
twice that number of casualties on the enemy.
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The
farmhouse built by Peter Valentine Kolb in 1836 reflects a wealthy
lifestyle unusual in North Georgia at the time. Although modest
compared to today's houses, the log cabin is about twice the normal
size for the area at that time. However, the most extravagant feature
of the farmhouse are the double chimneys on either end, rare in any
house of the day.
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When
Johnston arrived at Kennesaw Mountain, he set up a strong defensive
position, one that was stronger than any he had had since leaving
Dalton. On June 18th, he set up his headquarters in a little cottage
called "Fair Oaks" about a mile north of Marietta. Wheeler's reports
indicated that three corps of Union troops were maneuvering to turn
their left, while General James McPherson maintained a position to
their front. Knowing that as a result of the continuous days of rain
and the roads being nothing more than a quagmire of mud, a flanking
movement would be extremely difficult if not impossible. However, the
danger was present and Johnston moved Hood's troops on the 20th of June
from their position on the extreme right of their battle line, marching
them out of view of the Union troops to the left flank of his line. In
the previous four weeks, Johnston had pulled Hood's corps from the line
with the purpose of using them as a main attack force, but in this
move, it was to strengthen his left flank. He then had Wheeler's men
occupy the position on the right that Hood vacated.
Johnston,
in his wisdom, seemed to be reading Sherman's mind. Sherman thought
that Johnston's weak point was his left flank, as long as Johnston
acted on the defensive. However, Sherman also thought that if he
weakened part of his line for the purpose of obtaining additional
troops to attack the Union lines would be wise on Johnston's part, and
presumed that was Johnston's object. Also, Sherman was concerned about
the ability to receive supplies and to protect the railroad and the
depots, thus he had McPherson's Army of the Tennessee strengthen his
left flank, all the way across Noonday Creek whereas his right flank
extended across Nose's Creek. For nineteen days, the area received
rain, yet Sherman was determined to press on with his operations. Early
in the morning of the 22nd of June, Sherman rode the extent of his
lines. He ordered Thomas to advance his extreme right corps, Hooker's
20th Corps, and instructed Schofield to keep his 23rd Corps as a strong
right flank in support of Hooker's deployed line.
Following
Johnston's instructions, on the 20th of June, Hood had Stevenson's
Division march east to the extreme left of the army and was to be held
in reserve; about three miles from Marietta. They camped near the
Powder Springs Road and for two days, although they could hear the
cannonading and fighting to the northwest, they were able to enjoy two
days rest, despite the rain. Hood also had Hindman's Division march and
were placed to Stevenson's right.
On
the 22nd of June, Hood received word that the Union forces were driving
back Confederate cavalry and decided to attack. Hood assumed that
Sherman's forces would be the strongest on his center and left flank,
and that only part of Schofield's corps would be on his right. Without
informing Johnston of his plans; without knowing the enemy's strength
or position, blinded by eagerness and once again following the school
of thought of Lee and Jackson, ordered his troops forward. His plan, it
is assumed, was to turn Sherman's weak right flank, and circle behind
Sherman, thus having Johnston's other two corps on Sherman's front, and
he, with his corps at the rear, trapping Sherman.
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Assassinated
after the war, probably as a result of his opposition to carpetbagger
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Around
noon, Stevenson started moving troops down Powder Springs Road, halting
at Mount Zion Church. The rain had stopped, the sun came out brightly
and Stevenson, upon the orders from Hood, sent forth his skirmishers.
Shortly after 2:30 in the afternoon, these skirmishers came upon two
Union regiments advancing. Heavy firing from these skirmishers forced
the enemy back. This was reported to Hood who thought that these Union
units were the spearhead of an assault. Stevenson had Brown's and
Cummings Brigades form a frontal line with Reynold's and Pettus'
Brigades behind them. Constructing hastily breast-works of logs and
rails, Stevenson's troops waited for the enemy to come upon them.
Within a short time, Hood sent word to Stevenson and Hindman to advance
and drive the enemy down the road towards Manning's Mill. In launching
this attack, Hood did so without conducting any prior reconnaissance
and was not aware what exactly was in front of him. In reality,
Schofield's Army of the Ohio and Hooker's XXth Corps, and it was not
their exposed flank but their entrenched front that lay across his line
of advance.
If
Hood had the information sent to the headquarters of Jackson's Calvary
Division by Brigadier General Ross of Ross's Cavalry Brigade at 3:30
P.M., he might have not been so hasty in advancing to attack. He stated
in his communiqué, "My impression is that there is a
considerable force of infantry advancing in my front, but I have not
yet felt them, and have no means of judging except from the statements
of the colonel commanding force from Humes' division, who was driven
from Cheney's before I came out. Two regiments Federal cavalry have
moved past my position on the road from Cheney's to Powder Springs. I
gave notice of their move to General Armstrong, and have just received
a courier informing me that he is moving to meet them. If he attacks
vigorously on that road we shall compel the force at Cheney's to
develop itself. Their skirmish line is slowly and cautiously advancing
upon my position."
In a
later communiqué, Ross informed Jackson's headquarters the
following, "You (made a) mistake when you suppose(d) the force here to
be cavalry; it is infantry. Three regiments of cavalry passed toward
the bridge on the Powder Springs road, but did not halt here."
Even
with all this information, Stevenson ordered Brown's Brigade commanded
by Colonel Edward Cook of the 32nd Tennessee and supported by Reynold's
Brigade commanded by Colonel R. C. Trigg to move southeast from Powder
Springs Road towards Kolb's Farm. At the same time, Cumming's Georgia
Brigade commanded by Colonel E. P. Watkins of the 56th Georgia.
(Cumming's Brigade consisted of four Georgia regiments, the 34th, 36th,
39th, and the 56th), supported by Pettus' Brigade with Colonel C. M.
Shelly commanding, moved southeast from the south side of the Powder
Springs Road towards Kolb's Farm. (Kulp's Farm in Union Dispatches)
Upon
reaching the farm house area they came head to head with two Union
regiments, the 14th Kentucky of Hascall's Brigade of Schofield's Army
of the Ohio and the 123rd New York of Williams 1st Division of Hooker's
XXth Corps. Heavy fighting ensued, both by musketry and Federal
cannonading. Cumming's and Pettus' Brigades were repulsed from the
massive firepower of the Federals. Hood ordered them to re-form and
attack again. They were again repulsed with heavy losses, but he
rallied them and ordered them forward yet again, with the same result.
The ground that these two brigades had moved over and fought on, was in
reality a quagmire of mud from the rain it had received the two
previous weeks. Footing was difficult; movement of trains and
batteries, a near impossibility in their march to the farmhouse.
The
two left brigades, Brown's and Reynold's, were a little luckier. They
fought primarily against the 123rd New York a little north of Powder
Springs Road. Here they had dense undergrowth and footing was a little
better. They were successful in driving the enemy in confusion and
disorder through the woods.
Darkness
finally ended what became known as the Battle of Kolb's Farm with
Brown's and Reynold's Brigades laying in a swampy ravine, and Cumming's
and Pettus's Brigades holding the road to the left.
Hood
claimed a victory in driving back the Union troops to their reserve
line and was on the verge of routing Hooker's whole corps, and was only
stopped by darkness and the arrival of Federal reinforcements. The fact
is, the Confederate forces only opposed and drove back two Union
regiments to their main line. Confederate losses were in excess of 1000
men, with Stevenson's Division alone losing 870 men. The Federals
suffered losses of only 350.
In the
words of Lieutenant General Joseph E. Johnston about Hood and the
Battle of Kolb's Farm, "Hood had his moment of glory and reclaimed his
reputation as an aggressive commander, but at a cost the Confederacy
could ill afford."
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